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Introduction
Richard Lempert
I have found that the more deeply I am engaged in a scholarly
project, the more the details of my life become relevant to what I am
working on. Thus, it was that sitting in a dentist's chair for reconstructive work following a root canal, I saw a metaphor for what had been
troubling me about some of the evidence stories essays I was in the
midst of editing. The dentist had covered my mouth and part of my face
with a rubber dam, pierced so that only the tooth she was working on
was visible. It was as if the rest of the mouth, in which the tooth was set,
did not exist or, since it did exist, was irrelevant to the task at hand. The
dentist knew what she was doing, the rest of the mouth was irrelevant.
So it often is with great evidence cases. Evidence is procedure. There
need be no special story-no great dispute or fight for justice-behind a
great evidence case. Nor will deeper knowledge of case facts necessarily
reveal reasons for a rule or suggest the concerns that motivated a court's
decision. All that a great evidence case requires is a dispute over whether
a single item of evidence-as little as a single sentence or a few questions
in a 500 page transcript-should be admitted. The court's focus will be
on that sentence or question. Other case facts may be cited to give the
issue some context, but their importance to how the court resolves the
admissibility issue varies immensely. Sometimes they are essential to the
outcome if not determinative, but in other instances they do not matter
at all. Moreover, even when case context is integral to the resolution of
an evidentiary issue, the case need not be especially interesting or
noteworthy; the case story may be one that is hardly worth the telling.
This does not mean that there are no evidence stories worth
recounting. The essays in this volume show how interesting evidence
stories can be. Rather it means that evidence stories are not only highly
varied, but also that the central actors in an evidence story may have
played no role in the dispute giving rise to the case. Thus, the most
interesting actor in George Fisher's story of People v. Collins, the classic
case involving probability evidence, is neither Janet nor Malcolm Collins,
the defendants in the case, about whom little is known, nor the prosecutor who sought to bolster a weak but probably winnable case with
statistical evidence, nor the professor who, answering a phone message,
found himself that afternoon in court giving expert testimony. Rather it
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is the renowned Harvard Law School professor, leading Supreme Court
advocate and undergraduate math whiz Laurence Tribe, who as a law
clerk to Justice Tobriner of the California Supreme Court drafted much
of the opinion for which the case is celebrated, and then, in his first
major article as a law professor wrote, without mentioning his role in
Collins, the magisterial article, Trial by Mathematics. This article, written in response to an article by Michael Finkelstein and William Fairley
that advocated more sophisticated modes of presenting probabilistic
evidence, placed the issue of probabilistic proof and the application of
Bayes' Theorem in litigation on the agendas of evidence scholars for
generations to come. Similarly, in Christopher Mueller's discussion of
Michelson v. United States, which is the Supreme Court's most definitive
statement on the inquiries that may be made of a defendant's good
character witnesses, the story of the defendant Michelson is less interesting and less integral to the law the case gave rise to than the story of Mr.
Justice Jackson, who wrote the opinion for which the case is known. In
another story, Richard Friedman's account of Crawford v United States,
the author, more than anyone else, is the story's protagonist, for
Professor Friedman developed the confrontation clause theory that the
Supreme Court would later adopt in the case, and he consulted with
Crawford's appellate counsel throughout the litigation and on the Supreme Court brief.
Most of this volume's essayists do more than tell a story. They go on
to discuss how their case shaped the law of evidence and, often not
content to stop there, they critique the doctrine the case shaped. Indeed
in a few essays, most notably Paul Giannelli's treatment of the so-called
Daubert trilogy, the development of doctrine-in Daubert, rules regarding the admissibility of scientific evidence-is the heart of the story line.
Despite the special nature of some evidence stories, this volume does
not depart substantially from the spirit of the "Stories" series. Having
as one's protagonist a law professor or judge does not, as the reader will
see, preclude a good story, and even when actors like these are the main
protagonists, we learn about the characters and incidents that figured
most prominently in the litigation, often with the benefit of story facts
that have not heretofore been known. Moreover, not every evidence story
is special in the way I have just described. Indeed, most of the essays in
this volume did not bring the dentist's dam to mind, for in most the case
story is front and center, and key to other analysis. Thus, Peter Tillers
uses State v. Radziwell, perhaps the least well-known case in this
volume, to explore the boundary between character and habit by reconstructing the fatal accident that led to this prosecution and probing
deeply into the sad life of the defendant. Eleanor Swift elucidates the
admissions "exception" to the hearsay rule, as she skillfully tells the tale
of Sophie the wolf and the bites Sophie may or may not have inflicted on
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the child plaintiff in Mahlandt v. Wild Canid Survival & Research
Center, Inc .. And Marianne Wesson takes one of evidence law's classic
stories-the story of Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Hillman-and turns it
on its head, arguing that the Supreme Court was most likely mistaken
when, speaking through Mr. Justice Gray, it constructed a narrative that
seemingly compelled the conclusion that a man had been murdered to
perpetrate an insurance fraud, thereby motivating a broad exception to
the hearsay rule for statements of intent.
When an author writes a book or article or compiles and edits a
volume, somewhere, even if not articulated, there is a vision of the
intended audience. When law professors are authors that intended
audience is usually either other law professors, who are to be impressed
by the depth, care and subtlety of the writer's analysis, or judges or
policy makers, who, if they are fair-minded readers, will leave the article
persuaded that the author has outlined the best interpretation of received doctrine or the optimum path for doctrinal or other legal development. The essays in this volume, however, have a different intended
audience. I see most readers as students, primarily students in evidence
courses, especially problem-oriented courses.
Readers who know me as a co-author of A Modern Approach to
Evidence, will know that there are few more enthusiastic proponents of
the problem-oriented approach to teaching evidence than I. Nevertheless, something is lost when evidence instruction is focused on the
meaning of the Federal Rules and their application across a range of
abstracted if not artificial problem situations. Students do not get the
same sense of the history of evidence rules, or of the factual settings in
which they are applied and out of which they developed, when they read
text rather than cases. Indeed, they often don't get a rich sense of
context even when the case method is used, for so many rules have to be
taught in the typical evidence course that casebook authors tend to
extract most of the juice from most of the cases they reproduce. What is
left, and what once drove me to write a problem-oriented course book, is
in most cases a dry statement of facts with a judge expounding-much as
a problem-oriented writer does-on a rule and the reason for it. Thus I
see this book as a companion to the main text used in evidence courses.
It contains a collection of essays that allows students to appreciate the
rich contexts out of which evidence rules and interpretations of the
Federal Rules arise and in which they are applied. In doing so the essays
highlight the special roles that parties, case facts, judges, lawyers, social
critics and law professors can play in shaping the law of evidence, for
these features and actors are all important parts of at least some of the
essays in this volume.
My conception of the intended audience for this volume explains
some characteristics of the essays that appear. First, they are short as
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legal writing goes, usually between 25 and 30 pages or less. Stories
intended as adjunct reading can't be too lengthy. Some original submissions were shortened by as much as 50% to achieve this goal. Often
eliminated were detailed explanations of the evidence rules involved, for
these essays are not meant to teach students what the law provides.
That will be done by the teacher working from a problem text or
casebook. The stories in this volume are intended to add to basic
instruction, not to substitute for it.
Second, the reader will have noted that I refer to these stories as
essays and not as articles. I do this to emphasize that these works should
not be confused with most law review scholarship. The difference between then and the typical law review article is most evident in the
footnoting conventions I have used and to some degree imposed on some
authors. Although the reader will find exceptions, footnotes are largely
confined to substantive information that would be awkwardly placed in
the text, cites to specific cases and articles the first time they are
mentioned, block quotes or other particularly important quotations, and
information that my conventions might have eliminated but which I
thought would be useful for readers to have. I assumed students would
properly regard the authors of these essays as experts and not feel a
need to have the authors justify their expertise by referencing work
expressing views similar to the views they present in the text or laying
out facts that the author asserts. Also eliminated are most cites of
quotations to pages, so long as the source for the quotation is clear or
the quote is so short that its source is insignificant. In addition, I cut
side excursions, the little essays expanding on text that law professors,
myself among them, love to write but that, although interesting, are not
integral to the story line. I also eliminated from footnotes citing cases
and articles most parenthetical descriptions of what the cited material
was about. Most such elaboration was unnecessary because the text
almost always made it clear why the materials were referenced. The
idea, in short, was to minimize the need of readers to glance down for
additional information unless a note added something of interest to the
text or was a cite to an important sources or a case or article specifically
referenced.
Applying these conventions led to the elimination of as many as
three quarters of the footnotes in some of the essays as originally
submitted. Not all authors, it is fair to say, were completely pleased. Not
all readers, particularly professorial readers, will be completely pleased
either. Some may think a point firmly asserted is not as widely accepted
as the author indicates and will want to know more about the assertion's
justification. Some may want to check the context of a particular
quotation and will be disturbed if a page number, or worse yet a source,
is not indicated. Some may think that law review citation standards
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should apply to all serious scholarship that law professors publish (and
the essays in this volume are serious scholarship). Some readers may be
particularly upset, indeed they may feel there has been a breach of
scholarly norms, when their own pioneering or directly on point research
is not mentioned. Thus, the kindest thing that some readers may have to
say about the conventions I adopted is that they are misguided. Readers
who have any of these complaints should not blame the essayists for
omitted citations, but should blame me. It was I who insisted the
footnotes be kept to a minimum. This included, I should note, cutting
references to my own work in a number of places, although in one
instance an author was adamant about retaining a reference to my work
along with that of others, and after twice eliminating the citation, I let
the author have his way. 1
It would be foolish to pretend that I like all the essays in this
volume equally, and it would be even more foolish for me to list my
favorites. While I have referenced some specific essays as illustrations of
points I wish to make or as examples of what will be found in these
pages, I did not choose which pieces to mention based on what I saw as
the essays' relative merits. The reader will discover a number of excellent essays without any alert in this introduction. I will say, however, I
am extraordinarily pleased by the submissions I received. I do not think
there is a weak essay in this collection, and there are a large numbers of
essays that I think are not just good, but extraordinarily so. I am very
grateful to the authors who agreed to write for this volume, who put up
with my editorial nitpicking, or who submitted such polished first drafts
that there were no nits to pick. Their intelligence and scholarship add
fundamentally to our knowledge of the cases and rules we teach and
learn. I feel lucky that I was asked to edit a volume whose introduction I
can conclude with a single word-ENJOY.
1 There is one exception to the application of these conventions. This is the article by
Marianne Wesson on the Hillmon case. Professor Wesson has contributed an original and
important work of historical scholarship that goes beyond the historical excavations that
most of the volume's authors engaged in. Hence I thought it important that her original
sources be fully documented.

